







1 Introduction		Human	mobility	amidst	environmental	change	constitutes	 the	overwhelming	reality	 in	most	of	the	‘Global	South’,	where	wider	processes	of	change	such	as	urbanization,	land	use	 transition,	 globalization,	 and	 postcolonial	 relations	 are	 inextricably	 interwoven.	 It	should	 therefore	 be	 a	 platitude	 to	 say	 that	 migration,	 development	 and	 global	environmental	change	are	strongly	 inter-related	–	and	one	would	expect	this	to	be	the	starting	 point	 of	 any	 informed	 discussion	 on	 the	 nexus	 between	 climate	 change	 and	human	 mobility.	 However,	 this	 was	 not	 the	 case	 for	 the	 debates	 on	 climate-induced	migration	 that	 flourished	 in	 early	 1990s.	 They	were	 brought	 into	 the	 limelight	 by	 the	controversial	 figure	 of	 the	 climate	 refugee	 and	 the	 fear	 of	 the	 security	 implications	 of	environmentally-induced	mass	displacement.	Thereby,	the	question	of	‘development’	was	not	 central	 in	 the	 environmental	 sciences-dominated	 debate	 on	 the	 climate-migration	nexus,	 although	 vulnerability	 to	 environmental/climate	 change	 and	 the	 causes	 of	displacement	are	rooted	in	socio-economic	marginalization	(what	is	often	referred	to	as	a	lack	of	development).	Conversely,	although	the	nexus	between	migration	and	(global)	environmental	 change	 has	 been	 informed	 by	 a	 more	 or	 less	 explicit	 North-South	dichotomy,	it	has	been	neglected	by	scholars	in	the	field	of	‘migration	and	development’	and	by	international	fora	such	as	the	Global	Forum	on	Migration	and	Development	or	the	High	Level	Dialogue	on	Migration	and	Development.		Things	have	recently	changed.	The	old	debates	have	been	shaken	by	the	emergence	of	discourses	that	put	development	at	the	center	of	stage1.	Mobility	is	still	understood	as	a																																																									1	To	be	sure,	the	‘old’	alarmist	narratives	and	the	securitizing	tendencies	have	not	completely	disappeared		-	see	for	instance	the	ambiguous	tone	in	IPCC’s	AR5	ch	12	(2014),	and	the	recent	discussions	on	the	role	of	climatic	changes	in	the	ongoing	Syrian	conflict	(Kelley	et	al.	2015).	The	spectre	of	mounting	waves	of	climate	refugees	still	titillates	the	imagination	of	media	outlets,	see	for	instance	recent	pieces	in	popular	outlets	such	
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response	 to	 sudden	events	 and	 slow-onset	 environmental	 degradation,	 but	 (governed)	voluntary	migration	is	also	promoted	as	a	legitimate,	proactive	adaptation	strategy	aimed	at	reducing	the	vulnerability	of	population	at	risk	(Black	et	al.	2011).	The	‘migration	as	adaptation’	 	 thesis	resides	on	 the	recognition	of	migrants’	economic	agency	and	 in	 the	hope	that	remittances	will	be	invested	by	households	and	communities	to	build	resilience	(Warner	 and	Afifi	 2013).	Mobility	 is	 thus	 viewed	 also	 as	 a	mechanism	 that	 can	 foster	development	 and	 thereby	 reduce	 vulnerability	 –	 clearly	 striking	 chords	 linked	 to	 the	wider	debate	on	‘migration	and	development’.	In	turn,	a	series	of	high-level	actors	in	the	field	 of	migration	 and	development	 policy	 and	 advocacy,	 such	 as	 the	World	Bank,	 the	Asian	Development	Bank	(ADB)	and	the	International	Organization	for	Migration	(IOM),	have	engaged	with	the	question	of	climate-related	migration.			This	article	looks	closer	at	this	‘developmentalization’	of	the	debate	on	climate	migration;	it	 explores	 the	way	 the	emerging	discourses	 conceptualize	mobility	and	 its	 relation	 to	adaptation	and	development.	The	article	will	highlight	that	(a)	conceptually,	the	emerging	models	 and	 narratives	 on	 the	 environmental	 change-migration	 nexus	 can	 be	 hardly	understood	 in	 isolation	 from	 a	 series	 of	 long-standing	 debates	 in	 the	 fields	 of	development	 and	migration;	 (b)	 in	 terms	 of	 institutions	 and	 regimes,	 the	 interactions	between	mainstream	circles	concerned	with	these	intertwined	phenomena	(which	used	to	 be	 scant)	 are	 becoming	more	 intense	 and	 substantial.	Moreover,	 the	 following	will	show	how,	 in	 spite	of	 their	novelty	 in	 the	 context	 of	 climate	 adaptation,	 the	 emerging	discourses	 are	 brewed	 out	 of	 ingredients	 that	 are	 not	 new	 and	 are	 contested.	 The	‘migration	as	adaptation’	thesis	 is	built	on	theoretical	premises	drawn	from	a	strategic	merging	 of	 New	 Economic	 of	 Labour	 Migration	 (hereafter	 NELM)	 and	 Sustainable	Livelihood	approaches,	articulated	in	ways	that	reproduce	the	neoliberal	version	of	the	classical	 optimist	 take	 on	 the	migration-development	 nexus.	 The	 extent	 to	which	 this	evolution	represents	a	step	forward	is	yet	to	be	understood.	After	gathering	a	few	salient	highlights	on	the	evolutions	of	the	debate	on	‘migration	and	development’	 (section	 2),	 the	 article	 traces	 the	 changing	 understanding	 of	 mobility	underlying	 the	 discourses	 on	 climate-induced	migration;	 it	 puts	 in	 relation	 the	 initial	environmental	 determinism	 and	 pathologization	 of	 mobility	 with	 the	 debate’s	segregation	 from	 the	 migration	 and	 development	 community	 (section	 3).	 The	 ‘de-environmentalizaiton’	and	‘developmentalization’	of	the	discourses	are	documented	and	situated	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ‘migration	 and	 development‘	 literature	 (sections	 4).	 Before	
																																																								as	The	 Independent	 (http://goo.gl/fMbCJA),	The	 Guardian	 (http://goo.gl/LP37HV),	The	 National	 Observer	(http://goo.gl/ABcIPm).	
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concluding,	the	article	offers	some	critical	remarks	(section	5)	on	the	implications	of	such	evolutions,	in	dialogue	with	a	number	of	recent	critical	studies.	
2 Migration	and	Development:	Between	optimism	and	pessimism			As	the	following	sections	will	reveal	in	greater	detail,	the	various	discourses	on	climate	migration	 that	have	emerged	over	 time	reside	on	very	different	understandings	of	 the	ways	 in	which	migration	 relates	 to	 socio-economic	 development.	 Although	 this	 is	 not	often	 acknowledged,	 such	 understandings	 owe	 a	 lot	 to	 the	 long-standing	 debates	 on	‘migration	 and	 development’	 that	 have	 animated	 scholarship	 and	 practitioners	 over	several	decades.	As	a	 first	step	in	our	analysis,	 this	section	offers	a	 few	insights	on	the	evolution	of	such	broader	debates,	which	will	prove	useful	to	evaluate	the	discourses	on	climate	change	and	migration.		To	 begin	 with,	 views	 on	 the	 synergies	 between	 migration	 and	 development	 have	periodically	changed	sign	over	time.	Most	of	the	authors	who	have	engaged	in	a	critical	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	migration	and	development	identify	the	same	three	phases	in	the	evolution	of	the	post-war	debate	on	migration	and	development	(cf.	Table	1	 for	 a	 summary).	 Leaving	 aside	minor	 differences	 in	 periodization,	 such	 evolution	 is	characterized	as	swinging	from	optimistic	to	pessimistic	perspectives	on	the	capability	of	migration	to	make	a	difference	for	development	(Spaan	2005,	Faist	2009,	De	Haas	2010,	2012,		Gamlen	2014).	The	 phases	 identified	 by	 the	 literature	 are	 a	 post-war	 developmentalist	 optimism	stretching	 to	 the	 1960s,	 followed	 by	 a	Marxist	 pessimism	 over	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s,	which	leaves	the	way	to	a	new	optimistic	view	in	the	1990s	and	2000s,	largely	driven	by	empirical	work	based	on	NELM	approach	and	by	the	enthusiasm	for	surging	remittances	(cf.	 Ratha	 2003).	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 while	 the	 phases	 of	 pessimism	 focus	 on	 structural	constraints	at	the	macro-level,	largely	shaped	by	labour	markets	dynamics,	the	optimism	celebrates	the	agency	of	the	migrants	and	their	ability	to	“help	themselves”	via	rising	and	better	invested	remittance	inflows.		
 
Table 1: Brief timeline of debates, modified following de Haas 2010: 230 
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The	 proponents	 of	 the	 ‘migration	 as	 adaptation’	 thesis,	 appropriated	 this	 conceptual	framework	 and	 tested	 it	 in	 the	 context	 of	 environmental	 shocks	 (e.g.	 Paulson	 1993;	Laczko	and	Collett	2005;	Bettin	et	al	2014,	De	le	et	al	2014)	finding	similar	evidence,	as	well	as	momentum	for	praising	the	potential	role	of	remittances	in	reducing	vulnerability	at	the	household	and	community	levels.		As	put	by	IOM:		“Since	the	establishment	of	the	MDGs,	migration	has	been	acknowledged	as	a	major	driver	of	 development	 in	 countries	 of	 origin	 and	 destination	 alike.	 Migration	 remittances	 to	developing	countries	have	reached	the	same	level	as	major	international	capital	flows	for	development.	 In	a	world	that	 faces	severe	skills	shortages	on	various	 levels,	migration	 is	already	playing	an	essential	role	by	filling	labour	market	gaps.	In	the	context	of	natural	or	manmade	catastrophes	and	crises,	remittances	and	migration	can	support	the	resilience	of	populations	both	staying	and	going”.	(IOM	2014)		We	can	clearly	see	in	this	passage,	how	resilience	in	the	context	of	“natural	disaster”2	is	integrated	in	the	pre-existing	narrative	on	migration	and	development.	Another	key	aspect,	i.e.	the	so-called	‘triple	win’	mantra,	started	gaining	currency	in	the	debate:	 	 If	 properly	 harnessed,	 remittances	 (both	 social	 and	 financial)	 can	 benefit	 all,	sending	countries,	destination	countries	and	migrant	themselves.	Despite	its	failure	in	the	1960s,	‘circular	migration’	returns	to	be	depicted	as	the	most	virtuous	type	of	mobility,	as	it	entails	the	sharing	of	know-how	and	labour	between	the	less-developed	South	(supply)	and	the	developed	North	(demand).	Leading	international	bodies	conceptualise	migration	prioritising	circular	migration	(IOM	2005;	The	World	Bank	2013;	Hugo	2013;	Betts	2011),	more	 recently	with	 explicit	 reference	 to	 the	Post	2015	agenda	and	with	 an	 increasing	focus	on	South-South	migration	(IOM	2014).	Several	 critical	 scholars	 have	 contributed	 to	 problematize	 the	 nexus	 between	development	and	migration	 (e.g.	Kapur	2004;	de	Haas	2008;	2010;	Lindley	2009Piper	2009)	 and	 have	 cautioned	 against	 indulging	 in	 an	 often	 ungrounded	 “remittances	euphoria”,	which	underplays	important	factors	at	the	meso	and	macro	levels	and	often	generalize	success	stories	that	are	instead	context-specific	and	hardly	replicable.	Some	authors	have	drawn	attention	to	the	fact	that	migration-and-development	thinking	is	a	cover	for	the	immigration	control	agenda,	highlighting	that	swings	in	the	debate	have	mirrored	 the	 booms	 and	 busts	 in	 immigration	 economies	 (Gamlen	 2014).	Many	 have																																																									2	As put by Basher, “the term ‘natural disaster’ is an oxymoron, as the vulnerability and coping factors 
in the equation are within human control to some degree and therefore are not ‘natural’” (Basher 2006: 
2167) 	
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criticized	 the	 narrow	 focus	 on	 the	 entrepreneurial	 abilities	 of	 the	 migrant,	 who	 is	expected	to	shoulder	the	burden	of	development	alone.	The	emphasis	on	the	agency	of	migrant	can	also	be	linked	to	neoliberal	agendas	where	‘the	idea	of	social	responsibility	[is]	replaced	by	a	neoliberalized	care	of	the	self’	(see	Evans	and	Reid	2013:	11–12).		The	narrow	 focus	 on	 remittances’,	 i.e.	 self-help	 development	 ‘from	 below’	 could	 “shift	 the	attention	 away	 from	 structural	 constraints	 and	 the	 vital	 role	 of	 states	 in	 shaping	favourable	conditions	for	positive	development	impacts	of	migration	to	occur”(De	Haas,	2010:	227).		This	contribution	certainly	does	not	aim	at	providing	an	exhausting	account	of	the	“migration	and	development	debate”,	but	the	underscoring	of	its	main	trends	and	evolutions	 –	 as	 described	 by	 prominent	 scholars	 	 and	 summarized	 in	 table	 1	 -	 is	instrumental	to	the	analysis	of	the	discourse	on	climate	migration.		
3 The	origins:	Environmentally-induced	separation	
 To	 grasp	 the	 changing	 understanding	 of	 the	 links	 between	 mobility,	 environmental	change	and	development,	it	is	revealing	to	assess	the	context	in	which	the	concerns	over	the	 impacts	 of	 environmental	 degradation	 (including	 climate	 change)	 and	 human	migration	gained	momentum.		The	literature	(e.g.	Laczko	and	Aghazarm	2009;	Foresight	2011;	Gemenne	2011;	White	2011;	Morrissey	2012)	locates	the	origins	of	the	debates	on	the	link	global	environmental	change-migration	in	the	early	1980s,	when	the	UN	Environmental	Program	(El-Hinnawi	1985)	 and	 then	 the	World	Watch	 Institute	 (Jacobsen	 1988)	 published	 two	 reports	 on	‘environmental	 refugees’,	 a	 term	 in	 effect	 coined	 a	 few	 years	 earlier	 by	 Lester	 Brown	(1976).	The	discourses	on	environmentally	induced	migration	emerged	within	epistemic	and	 policy	 circles	 committed	 to	 environmental	 stewardship,	 whose	 epistemological	foundations	and	policy	concerns3	were	at	loggerheads	with	the	intellectual	leanings	and	policy	priorities	prevalent	among	scholars	and	professionals	working	on	migration	and	development.	The	question	of	environmentally	induced	migration	was	indeed	dominated	by	 an	 ‘alarmist’	 (cf.	 Gemenne	 2011	 b)	 or	 ‘maximalist’	 (cf.	 Morrissey	 2009)	 approach,	according	 to	 which	 “environmental	 disruptions,	 among	 which	 the	 impacts	 of	 climate	change	in	particular,	will	induce	massive	population	displacements”	(Gemenne	2011	b:	225).	By	floating	around	impressive	(and	inaccurate)	figures	of	forced	migrants	displaced	by	 climate	 change,	 the	 alarmist	 or	 ‘maximalist’	 coalition	 stressed	 the	 urgency	 of	 the	threats	posed	by	climate	change	putting	the	issue	under	the	rubric	of	national	security																																																									3	for	a	thorough	discussion	of	this	point,	see	Bettini	and	Anderson	(2014)		
	 8	
more	than	of	development.	With	a	specific	focus	on	the	causative	effect	of	climate	change,	the	maximalist	 narrative	 pivots	 around	 the	 attempt	 to	 discern	 environmental	 drivers	from	 other	 root-causes	 of	 mobility	 (e.g.	 poverty,	 conflict	 etc.)	 in	 order	 to	 produce	estimates	of	potential	‘environmental	migrants’	or	‘climate	refugees’,	often	portrayed	as	a	 security	 threat,	 in	 future	climate	change	scenarios	 (Suhrke	1994;	Myers	1993,	1997,	2002;	Stern	2007;	Homer	Dixon	1999;	Reuveny	2007;	WBGU	2008).		Environmental	and	climate	refugees	served	as	an	emblematic	portrayal	of	 the	dangers	posed	by	environmental	and	climate	change:	in	the	liberal/humanitarian	version,	a	plea	for	immediate	efforts	to	address	climate	change	in	terms	of	both	scholarly	and	financial	commitment	 (Biermann	 and	 Boas	 2010,	 Environmental	 Justice	 Foundation	 2009,	Christian	 Aid	 2007);	 in	 the	 reactionary	 articulation,	 an	 exhortation	 to	 (more	 or	 less	literally)	close	the	ranks	in	preparation	for	the	post-climate	change	chaos	(Schwartz	and	Randall	2003;	Council	of	the	European	Union	2008).				The	 reality	 of	 mobility	 amidst	 environmental	 change	 is	 of	 course	 far	 less	 linear,	deterministic	and	media-friendly	than	what	initially	suggested.	Projections	of	the	number	of	 climate	 refugees	 are	 grounded	 on	 a	 narrow	 environmental	 determinism,	 simply	feeding	 the	 number	 of	 people	 living	 in	 places	 at	 risk	 into	 climate	 scenarios,	 without	considering	 the	degree	of	 resilience	and	adaptive	 capacity	of	 affected	 communities,	 as	shaped	by	a	multiplicity	of	social,	economic,	political	and	institutional	factors	(Black	2001;	2008;	Barnett	2002;	Gemenne	2011a;	Jakobeit	and	Methmann	2012).	Moreover,	data	are	sparse	and	hard	to	harmonize	(especially	when	it	comes	to	the	most	vulnerable	areas)	and,	 despite	 the	 progresses,	 effective	 methods	 to	 model	 the	 complex	 interactions	 of	environmental	drivers	with	other	socioeconomic	forces	are	at	a	nascent	stage	(Kniveton	et	al.	2008;	2011;	McLeman	2012).	For	all	its	merits,	also	the	initial	idea	of	harnessing	the	figure	of	the	climate	refugee	for	an	extension	of	the	Geneva	Refugee	Convention	to	include	climate-displaced	 persons	 (Williams,	 2008,	 Conisbee	 and	 Simms,	 2003)	 has	 proven	unfeasible.	For	instance,	the	UNHCR	rejected	the	label	‘environmental	refugee’	or	‘climate	refugee’	on	the	grounds	that	the	current	legal	category	defining	a	refugee	is	linked	to	a	notion	of	persecution	and	the	crossing	of	an	international	border,	which	is	not	the	case	for	environmentally	induced	displacement	(Piguet	2008;	Gemenne	and	Bruecker	2015).	The	enthusiasm	around	this	project	has	significantly	cooled	down,	leaving	the	ground	to	alternative	 and	more	 ad	 hoc	 initiative	 to	 promote	 protection	 in	 the	 context	 of	 cross-border	 environmental	 displacement,	 such	 as	 the	 consultative	 process	 initiated	 by	 the	
	 9	
Nansen	Initiative4.	It	is	not	hard	to	understand	why	migration	scholars	and	critical	social	scientists	found	the	maximalist	 perspective	 indigestible	 –	 pushing	 instead	 a	 “minimalist”	 or	 “skeptical”	approach.	The	maximalists’	 deterministic	understanding	of	migration	 clashes	with	 the	recognition	of	the	complexity,	nuances	and	multi-causal	nature	of	human	mobility	that	informs	 contemporary	migration	 studies.	Moreover,	 the	 specter	of	mounting	waves	of	climate	refugees	has	been	criticized	for	paving	the	way	to	a	securitization	of	migration	and	to	xenophobic	sentiments	(Hartmann,	2010,	Smith,	2007,	Oels	2008;	Gill	2010;	Oels	2013).	Alarmist	tones	on	the	‘barbarians	at	the	gate’	(cfr.	Bettini	2013)	also	conflict	with	the	widespread	efforts	by	migration	advocacy	groups	to	de-pathologize	the	figure	of	the	migrant	and	to	support	her	rights.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	critical	social	scholarship	have	not,	until	recently,	fully	engaged	with	the	question	of	how	ongoing	and	future	socio-ecological	transformations	will	impact	on	human	mobility5.		At	the	policy	level,	we	see	a	similar	situation.	Climate	change	was	initially	absent	from	the	radar	 screen	of	 international	bodies	dealing	with	human	mobility	 –	when	not	 actively	avoided.	The	case	of	IOM	is	exemplary:	as	reported	by	Frank	Laczko,	head	of	the	Migration	Research	Division	at	IOM,	as	recently	as	in	2006,	he	was	told	by	its	Member	States:	“Do	not	touch	the	environment.	It	has	nothing	to	do	with	migration.	It	is	not	your	concern”	(Laczko	2008:	2).		But	things	have	changed	fast.		
4 From	climate-induced	displacement	to	climate	mobilities		In	recent	years,	new	problematizations	of	the	climate-migration	nexus	have	emerged,	and	the	 topic,	 once	 confined	 to	 relatively	 marginal	 environmental	 (alarmist)	 arenas,	 has	reached	the	top	spheres	of	international	policies	circles,	including	those	of	development	and	migration.	
4.1 Mainstreaming	climate	migration		To	 begin	 with,	 the	 question	 of	 migration	 has	 gained	 ground	 within	 the	 institutional	scientific	 and	 policy	 agenda	 on	 climate	 change.	 It	 has	 formally	 been	 included	 in	 the	UNFCCC	 process	 –	 notably	 in	 Paragraph	 14	 (f)	 of	 the	 Cancun	 Agreement	 (see	 on	 this	Warner	 (2012))	 and	within	 the	Warsaw	 International	Mechanism	 for	 the	definition	of	
																																																								
4 Launched in 2012, the Nansen Initiative is a state-led, bottom-up consultative process intended to 
build consensus on the development of a protection agenda addressing the needs of people displaced 
across international borders in the context of drought, flooding and other natural hazards, including 
those linked to the effects of climate change. (www.nanseninitiative.org/) 5		According	 to	 the	 leading	 migration	 scholar	 Stephen	 Castle,	 his	 discipline	 has	 until	 recently	neglected	the	role	played	by	environmental	change,	an	important	factor	in	human	mobility	since	centuries,	and	likely	to	become	more	and	more	relevant	in	the	context	of	climate	change	(Castles	2011).	
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‘Loss	and	Damage’	(James	et	al.	2014).	The	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC	2014)	has	devoted	an	increased	attention	to	the	matter,	in	particular	in	chapter	12	of	its	latest	assessment	report.	Climate	migration	has	also	entered	key	international	arenas	on	migration.		IOM	–	again,	a	good	barometer	of	trends	in	mainstream	migration	scholarship	and	advocacy	–	has	now	become	one	of	 the	major	 international	players	 addressing	 the	 issue	of	 ‘environmental	migration’.	 For	 instance,	 in	 December	 2014,	 IOM	 has	 launched	 the	 Environmental	Migration	Portal	“Knowledge	Platform	on	people	on	the	move	 in	a	changing	climate	to	facilitate	dialogue	and	information	sharing”6.	Also,	in	line	with	the	wider	and	fast	growing	agenda	 advocating	 for	 “adaptive	 development”	 	 (Agrawal	 and	 Lemos	 2015),	 IOM	 is	coordinating	several	initiatives	aimed	at	mainstreaming	development	and	migration	as	a	positive	 form	of	adaptation	 to	 (global)	environmental	 change.	 IOM	has	also	developed	guidelines	 for	 the	 integration	of	migration	 into	National	Adaptation	Plans	 (NAP):	 “The	UNFCCC’s	national	adaptation	plan	(NAP)	could	prove	to	be	a	key	channel	for	ensuring	
mobility	is	addressed	in	national	plans	and	strategies.	Like	its	predecessor,	the	NAPA,	the	NAP	focuses	on	the	 least	developed	countries,	but	 the	UNFCCC	envisages	the	NAP	as	a	relevant	framework	for	all	affected	developing	countries”.	(IOM	2014:	67).			
4.2 De-environmentalizing	climate	migration The	 mainstreaming	 of	 climate	 migration	 has	 gone	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 its	 ‘de-environmentalization’:	the	(mis)understanding	of	migration	that	informed	the	previous	discourses	 has	 been	 gradually	 replaced	 by	 more	 accurate	 understandings	 of	 human	mobility	 and	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 ecological	 conditions	 influence	 it	 –	 thanks	 to	 the	growing	engagement	of	migration	scholars7.		Reducing	 the	maximalist	model	 to	 the	 bone,	 it	 brings	migration	 into	 the	 picture	 as	 a	reactive	survival	strategy	to	which	an	individual/household/community	is	forced	when	confronting	 a	 dose	 of	 environmental	 stress	 in	 excess	 of	 its	 coping	 capacity.	Migration	signifies	 a	 failure	 to	 adapt:	 had	 an	 individual/household/community	 been	 able	 to	withstand	 environmental	 stressors	 successfully,	 there	would	 be	 no	 need	 to	move	 (i.e.	successful	adaptation).		In	contemporary	debates,	climate	and	environmental	changes	are	understood	as	factors	adding	to	and/or	impacting	on	‘conventional’	drivers	of	migration	(e.g.	see	the	model	in	
																																																								6	http://www.iom.int/cms/envmig  	7	The case of Prof Richard Black is exemplary: once a fierce critic of the “myth” of environmental 
refugees (Black 2001), he has been a vocal proposer of the new, sounder approaches to the climate-
migration nexus (e.g. Black et al. 2011; Black et al. 2013).	
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Foresight	2011,	Black	et	al	2013).	The	impacts	of	climate	change	on	mobility	are	therefore	discussed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 already	 existing	migratory	 processes	 and	 the	 inter-related	outcomes	of	mobility	patterns,	ranging	from	displacement	to	proactive	labour	migration	(Foresight	 2011;	 see	 ch.	 12	 IPCC	 2014).	 Different	 forms	 of	 mobility	 form	 part	 of	 an	
adaptation	 continuum	 (Warner	 2009;	 Beardsley	 and	 Hugo	 2010),	 i.e.	 are	 among	 the	multiple	strategies	through	which	communities	and	households	react	to	crises	but	also	adapt	to	changes.	Crucially,	the	discourse	is	thus	one	of	migration	in	the	context	of	climate	change,	no	longer	limited	to	forced	movements,	but	with	mobility	conceived	as	an	array	of	(often	interwoven)	reactive	and	a	proactive	strategies	and	behaviours.		In	a	decisive	turn,	the	failure	to	adapt	is	linked	to	immobility	rather	than	to	mobility;	not	only	those	displaced,	but	also	the	so-called	“trapped	population”	(those	who	are	unable	to	 move	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 human,	 social,	 and	 financial	 capital)	 are	 now	 identified	 as	 an	adaptation	failure	(Black	et	al	2012).			
 
On these grounds, a new wave of interventions have promoted (governed) migration	 as	 a	potentially	‘positive’	form	of	adaptation	and	as	a	strategy	for	managing	risks	associated	with	changing	environmental	conditions (e.g. Barnett and Webber 2009; Foresight 2011, 
ADB 2012, Geddes and Jordan 2012; Banerjee et al 2013; Warner and Afifi 2014,	 Black,	Bennett,	Thomas,	&	Beddington,	2011;	ADB	2011;	Warner	et	al	2013;	2014).  The	forms	of	migration	imagined	and	configured	by	this	understanding	are	very	different	than	 those	 conveyed	 by	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘climate	 refugees’.	 Climate	 migration	 in	 this	framing	entails	voluntary	movements,	or	at	least	migration	(and	possibly	relocation)	that	is	the	result	of	a	decision.	These	movements	are	understood	as	‘normal’	(not	pathological)	and	do	not	necessarily	represent	a	 threat.	Climate	migration	 is	not	anymore	 identified	with	floods	of	refugees,	but	rather	understood	as	the	set	of	impacts	that	climate	change	will	 exercise	 on	 existing,	 already	 functioning	migration	 processes,	 for	 the	most	 intra-regional,	and	for	the	most	configured	as	labour	migration.	
4.3 Agents	of	Development	/	Agents	of	Adaptation	In	spite	of	the	novelty	 it	comes	coated	in,	 the	re-conceptualization	of	migration	amidst	climatic	and	environmental	change	in	effect	entails	primarily	a	repositioning	rather	than	the	creation	of	new	approaches.	The	emerging	discourses	on	climate	change,	migration	and	development	owe	a	lot	to	the	debates	on	the	migration-development	nexus	discussed	in	Section	2.	The	discourses	on	migration	as	adaptation	clearly	echo	the	recent	wave	of	(neoliberal)	optimism	that	sees	migration	has	an	engine	for	development.	As	we	will	see	in	 the	 following,	 the	 risk	 is	 that	 the	 discourses	 on	 climate	 migration	 gather	 a	 rather	
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simplistic	 heuristic	 version	 of	 such	 models,	 inheriting	 from	 them	 also	 a	 number	 of	shortcomings.		The	rhetoric	on	the	positive	feedback	loops	ignited	by	migration	and	remittances	echoes	mainstream	narratives	 on	 virtuous	 circles	 set	 in	motion	 by	migration	 that	 inform	 the	discourse	 of	 international	 policy	 actors,	 such	 as	 IOM,	 the	 World	 Bank,	 the	 Asian	Development	Bank	and	UNDP.	More	specifically,	the	emerging	discourses	on	‘migration	as	adaptation’	are	conceptually	grounded	in	the	merging	of	two	theoretical	approaches:	NELM	(Stark	and	Bloom	1985)	and	Sustainable	Livelihoods	Approach	(SLA)(Chambers	and	Conway	1992).		In	 a	 2008	 IOM	 study,	 Kniveton	 at	 al.	 claim	 that	 “[t]aken	 together,	 the	 SLA	 and	NELM	approaches	provide	a	way	of	understanding	how	households	respond	to	climate	shocks,	and	the	extent	to	which	migration	is	part	of	their	response”	(Kniveton	et	al	2008:	39).	The	potential	descending	from	the	merging	these	two	approaches	did	not	go	unnoticed	also	among	 ‘migration	 and	 development’	 scholars.	 De	 Haas	 in	 2010	 tried	 to	 elaborate	 a	conceptual	framework	to	overcome	the	structure/agency	dichotomy	by	integrating	and	amending	 insights	 from	 NELM,	 livelihood	 perspectives	 in	 development	 studies	 and	transnational	 perspectives	 in	 migration	 studies	 	 “which	 share	 several	 though	 as	 yet	unobserved	conceptual	parallels”	(De	Haas	2010).	
	NELM	is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	decision	to	migrate	for	labour	should	not	be	considered	as	the	attempt	of	a	rational	actor	to	maximize	individual	income,	but	rather	as	a	household	strategy	to	diversify	the	income	streams	(Stark	&	Levhari	1982;	Taylor	1999;	Massey	and	Parrado	1998.	Households,	rather	than	individual,	become	the	unit	of	decision	making,	as	“migration	decisions	are	often	made	 jointly	by	the	migrant	and	by	some	group	of	non-migrants”	(Stark	and	Bloom,	1985:	175).	The	implicit	contract	among	these	actors	is	that	migrants	are	bound	to	remit.	Spatial	diversification	of	labour	and	resource-pooling	help	the	household	to	mitigate	risks	(Arango,	2000),	such	as	crop	failure	caused	by	changing	weather	patterns	or	environmental	shocks.	Migration	as	a	risk	minimizing	strategy	acts	as	 a	 form	 of	 insurance	 or	 social	welfare,	 for	 those	 countries	where	 private	 insurance	mechanisms	 are	 unavailable,	 imperfect	 or	 inaccessible	 to	 poor	 families	 (Massey	 at	 al	1993;	 Yang	 and	 Choi,	 2007).	 Thereby,	 remitted	 assets	 cushion	 risk	 and	might	 have	 a	transformative	impact,	especially	in	rural	economies	(Taylor	and	Martin	2001).		Concurrently,	 SLA	 emerged	 within	 development	 debates	 as	 a	 holistic	 theory	 to	understand	rural	poverty	and	to	contribute	to	its	eradication	(Bebbington	1999;	Carney	1998;	Ellis	2000).	SLA	pivots	on	 the	 idea	 that	households	possess	a	variety	of	natural,	physical,	 financial,	 human	 and	 social	 assets	 (the	 so-called	 ‘asset	 pentagon’)	 all	
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contributing	 to	 the	 household’s	 livelihood.	 If	 one	 of	 the	 assets	 suffers	 a	 loss	 (due	 to	various	 kind	 of	 shocks,	 including	 environmental	 ones),	 it	 can	 be	 compensated	 for	 by	falling	back	on	the	other	available	assets	(DFID,	2000).		The	influential	Foresight	Report	(2011),	issued	by	the	UK’s	Government	Office	for	Science,	is	 theoretically	 grounded	 on	 the	 integration	 of	 a	 specific	 understanding	 of	 migration	(NELM),	 into	the	most	prominent	framework	for	understanding	rural	development	(as	exemplified	 in	 the	 asset	 pentagon,	 p.	 33).	 Migration	 is	 hence	 re-conceptualized	 as	 a	positive	form	of	adaptation	and	research	efforts	are	re-directed	towards	understanding	“the	 role	 of	 migration	 in	 managing	 risks	 associated	 with	 changing	 environmental	conditions”	(Warner	et	al	2014:	1	see	also	Black,	et	al,	2011;	Hugo	2008;	Piguet	2010).		The	 discourse	 on	 ‘migration	 as	 adaptation’	 is	 in	 fact	 profoundly	 indebted	 to	 that	conceptual	 framework.	For	 instance,	 the	United	Nations	University	project	 “Where	 the	rain	 falls”	 is	 conceptually	 grounded	 on	 NELM.	 Embracing	 the	 shift	 form	 the	 earlier	‘climate	change	and	migration’	paradigm,	the	summary	of	the	project	frames	migration	as	
a	risk	management	option	vis-à-vis	climatic	stressors”	(Warner	et	al	2014:	1)	–		and	the	1982	paper	by	Stark	&	Levhari	 is	explicitly	quoted	as	theoretical	reference	allowing	to	move	 the	 question	 from	 the	 identification	 of	 environmental	 drivers	 as	 the	 sole	 causal	factors	 of	mobility,	 to	 the	 role	 of	migration	 as	 a	 risk	mitigation	 strategy.	 The	defining	pillars	of	the	mainstream	and	NELM-inspired	articulation	of	the	migration-development	nexus	are	also	replicated	in	the	new	problematization	of	climate	migration.		Two	things	are	worth	noting	here:	Firstly,	there	has	clearly	been	scant	cross-fertilization	among	scholarships.	Despite	the	fact	that,	since	2008,	the	SLA	and	NELM-based	research	design	has	provided	 the	 theoretical	 base	 for	 the	new	generation	 of	 studies	within	 the	migration	 and	 climate	 change	 research	 area,	 development	 scholars	 seem	 to	 have	overlooked	this	contribution	and	refrained	from	contributing	to	the	debate.		 	Secondly,	 critique	 of	 NELM	 and	 SLA	 previously	 articulated	 in	 ‘migration	 and	development’	and	critical	geography	studies	are	not	taken	into	full	consideration	and	only	mentioned	en	passant	by	 ‘migration	and	climate	change’	 scholars,	who	seldom	benefit	from	the	 lesson	 learnt	and	hold	 to	a	rather	simplified	and	heuristic	version	of	 the	 two	approaches.	A	conspicuous	body	of	work	have	cautioned	against	the	wave	of	enthusiasm	driven	 by	 surging	 remittances	 and	 all-to-easy	 linkages	 between	 remitted	 assets	 and	poverty	 reduction,	 or	 development.	 Kapur	 (2005)	 has	 investigated	 the	 ideological	dimension	of	 the	 ‘remittaces	mantra’,	 pointing	 at	 its	proximity	 to	 a	neoliberal	 agenda,	interested	 in	 promoting	 “self-help”	 development,	 so	 that	 ‘‘immigrants, rather than 
governments, […] become the biggest provider of ‘‘foreign aid’’ (Kapur, 2005:10).	 
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Crucial	questions	like:	Who	is	going	to	benefit	from	remittances?	What	are	their	impacts	on	 existing	 (gendered)	 power	 relations?	 have	 been	 overlooked.	 Both	 NELM	 and	 SLA	“rarely	include	analysis	of	unequal	power	relations	in	the	migration	process,	and	within	the	conflicting	networks	of	migrant	and	other	non	migrant	people	involved,	such	as	those	between	or	within	communities	and	household,	men	and	women,	or	different	age	groups”	(Thieme	2011:	332).	The	 attention	 to	 the	household	 as	decision	making	unit	 and	 remittances	 recipient	has	been	criticized	 for	neglecting	power	 inequalities	at	both	 the	community	and	 the	 intra-household	 level	 and	 for	 its	 limited	 versatility,	 as	 it	 focuses	 on	 male-dominated	 and	predominately	 temporary,	 circular	 labour	 migration	 (Aragno,	 2000;	 Lindley,	 2009	 de	Haas,	2010;	Kunz	2012).	All	of	these	critiques	could	be	easily	replicated	for	the	literature	arguing	for	the	‘migration	as	adaptation’	thesis.	Root	causes	of	poverty	and	inequality	remain	still	undertheorised	and	hidden	behind	a	naturalization	of	the	drivers	of	mobility	as	well	as	an	atomization	of	their	 impact.	 While	 praising	 remittances	 for	 adaptation,	 important	 (gendered)	dimensions	of	migration	and	their	embeddedness	in	the	material	conditions	of	labour	and	remittance	economies	remains	still	uncharted	territory.	
5 The	dark	side	of	development?	
 
It is too early to evaluate the fate, impacts and ‘success’ of these emerging discourses, which 
are still pretty much object of political negotiation and yet to inform actual policies, and only a 
limited number of studies (Felli 2013; Bettini 2014; Methmann and Oels 2015) examine the contours	 and	 implications	 of	 the	 shift	 to	 more	 optimistic	 discourses	 on	 the	 nexus	migration-adaptation.	The	conclusions	of	such	studies,	together	with	the	insights	offered	by	our	analysis	here,	seem	to	question	both	the	novelty	and	the	prospect	for	the	emerging	discourses	on	‘migration	as	adaptation’	to	represent	a	democratization	of	the	debate	and	an	emancipatory	turn.	The	‘reasons	for	concern’	can	be	summarized	in	four	key	points.		To	 begin	 with,	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 new	model	 and	 the	 narratives	 on	 ‘migration	 as	adaptation’	 has	 brought	 a	 breath	 of	 fresh	 air	 into	 a	 debate	 previously	 soaked	 in	environmental	determinism	and	immobilized	by	the	opposition	between	the	alarmism	of	some	and	reluctance	of	others	to	deal	with	the	phenomenon.	It	has	also	been	instrumental	to	involving	actors	in	the	mainstream	fora	of	 international	development	and	migration	governance	 like	 ADB,	 IOM	 and	 the	 World	 Bank,	 for	 which	 the	 ‘environmental	 crisis’	narrative	of	the	past	was	probably	unpalatable.	Second,	 the	 new	 discourses	 bring	 different	 subjectivities	 and	 characters	 to	 the	 center	stage:	the	figure	of	climate	refugee	(destitute	victim,	the	potential	sources	of	insecurity)	
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is	increasingly	supplanted	by	the	climate	migrant,	a	(pro)active	‘agent	of	adaptation’	and	eventually,	a	‘resilient	subject’	(Felli	2013;	Bettini	2014).	With	a	transition,	as	captured	by	 Methmann	 and	 Oels’	 trenchant	 critique	 of	 such	 emphatic	 narratives,	 from	 climate	refugees	to	be	protected	to	migrants	as	 ‘warriors	of	resilience’	eager	to	be	empowered	(Methmann	and	Oels	2015).	In	this,	the	emerging	discourses	clearly	follow	the	steps	of	the	optimistic	turns	in	the	‘migration	and	development’	debate	(inheriting	also	their	weak	points,	see	the	previous	sections).		Third,	 the	 ‘positive’	 narratives	 on	 climate	 migrants	 as	 adaptive	 agents	 should	 not	 be	mistaken	for	a	plea	for	free	migration.	In	fact,	they	envision	very	disciplined	and	specific	forms	 of	 mobility:	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 facilitate	 ‘virtuous’	 labour	 migration,	 in	 particular	temporary	or	circular	South-South	workforce	movements	(cfr.	Bettini	2014:	185ff).		Fourth,	 labour	 migration	 is	 acknowledged	 a	 potential	 benefit	 for	 adaptation	 and	resilience	thanks	to	its	capacity	to	generate	individual	–	and	at	times	collective	(Scheffran	et	al	2012)	-	financial	and	social	remittances.		Remittances	are	preached	for	representing	a	quick	and	targeted	form	of	self-insurance,	complementing,	when	not	substituting	weak	or	inexistent	formal	insurance	mechanisms	and	social	security:	the	quickly	flow	in	in	case	of	 shocks	 (such	 as	 ‘natural’	 disasters),	 contribute	 to	 recovery	 and	 thereby	 also	 avoid	displacement	 (e.g.	Foresight	2011:	21,	144;	ADB	2012:	42).	Relatedly,	 remittances	can	also	 facilitate	 long-term	 strategies	 of	 risk	 minimization,	 not	 least	 by	 financing	 the	underwriting	of	insurances	(Foresight	2011:	53).	Even	more	importantly	in	the	context	of	 this	paper,	 remittances	are	seen	as	 the	 trigger	 igniting	positive	 feedback	 loops	 that,	through	a	series	of	beneficial	impacts	of	migration,	increase	the	social	and	human	capital	held	by	households	and	thereby	make	them	resilient.	This	is	the	process	labelled	by	some	‘content	migration’	(Warner	and	Afifi	2013),	envisioned	as	part	of	a	process	of	potential	
transformative	adaptation	bringing	populations	out	of	vulnerability	while	lifting	them	out	of	poverty	and	skewed	power	relations.		The	 last	 two	 points	 highlight	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 emerging	 discourses	 articulate	‘development’	and	its	connections	to	mobility	and	climate	change	in	a	very	peculiar	way.		The	growing	centrality	of	development	and	the	fact	that	climate	migration	has	become	a	salient	topic	beyond	environmental	circles	should	be	not	taken	solely	as	a	sign	of	a	long	due	‘de-environmentalization’	of	the	debate.	As	we	have	seen,	the	increasing	involvement	of	migration	and	development	scholars	and	practitioners	has	contributed	to	overcoming	the	environmental	determinism	that	permeated	the	‘old’	narratives	on	climate	refugees.	But	 this	 has	 not	 entailed	 a	 recognition	 of	 the	 political	 (instead	 of	 environmental)	character	of	the	nexus	between	climate	change	and	mobility.	Bringing	‘development’	on	the	 table	 has	 not	 rhymed	 with	 focusing	 on	 the	 political,	 ecological,	 and	 economic	
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processes	 that	 determine	 whether	 (im)mobility	 is	 a	 self-reinforcing	 symptom	 of	marginalization	or	an	occasion	for	emancipation	and	reduction	of	vulnerability.	Rather,	the	 emerging	 discourses	 reproduce	 (quite	 uncritically)	 the	 optimistic	 sides	 of	 the	migration	 and	 development	 debate,	 articulated	 along	 the	 lines	 and	 strategies	 of	contemporary	neoliberal	management	of	 labour.	Significantly,	when	mobilized	 to	cope	with	the	impacts	of	climate	change,	labour	migration	becomes	a	means	to	govern	risk	via	the	disciplining	of	the	behaviour	of	ecologically	and	economically	vulnerable	populations.	Basically,	it	is	through	labour	markets	that	the	vulnerable	are	transformed	into	adapted,	resilience	subjects,	and	it	is	primarily	though	remittances	that	such	a	transformations	is	envisioned	to	take	place.	Such	an	articulation	is	far	from	unproblematic,	not	least	as,	at	the	end	of	the	day,	it	shifts	the	responsibility	(for	successful	adaptation,	for	survival)	onto	the	vulnerable.	It	represent	an	attempt		to	individualize	climate	adaptation	in	ways	that	extend	 a	 series	 of	 neoliberal	 economic	 relations	 that	 reproduce	 the	 conditions	 out	 of	which	vulnerabilities	emerge	(Felli	2013).	Moreover,	 this	 ‘transformative’	vision	 is	not	without	losers	–	the	gates	of	migration	are	open	to	those	docile	subjects	able	and	allowed	to	follow	the	signals	of	labour	market.	The	ways	in	which	the	virtuous	circles	and	adaptive	potentials	of	mobility	can	be	extended	to	those	who	for	some	reasons	result	unfit	to	this	logic	(or	are	left	outside	labour	migration	quotas)	is	unclear	–	as	unclear	is	their	fate	(on	the	problem	of	the	'unfit',	see	Bettini	2014).	
 
6 Conclusions	 This	 article	 has	 highlighted	 that	 climate	 change,	 migration	 and	 development	 are	increasingly	being	addressed	together;	in	particular,	the	question	of	how	climate	change	will	influence	migration	has	been	‘de-environmentalized’	and	important	actors	concerned	with	development	and	migration	are	‘colonizing’	an	issue	once	belonging	to	climate	and	environmental	arenas	–	which	is	not	per	se	a	negative	evolution.		It	 is	 worth	 stressing	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 this	 opening	 intervention	 is	 not	 to	 sponsor	 any	apologetic	narrative	that	joins	climate	adaptation,	migration	and	development	–	the	point	we	are	making	is	not	normative,	and	we	are	not	implying	that	associating	climate	change,	migration	and	development	is	per	se	positive	or	undesirable.	The	previous	sections	have	showed	 that	 while	 the	 models	 that	 inform	 these	 interactions	 are	 hardly	 new	 and	empirically	controversial	(as	the	literature	on	‘migration	and	development’	testifies),	they	are	 even	 more	 contested	 from	 a	 political	 and	 normative	 angles.	 Significantly,	 the	association	 migration-climate-development	 is	 structured	 along	 a	 markedly	 neoliberal	line.		
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To	be	clear,	we	have	no	nostalgia	 for	the	Malthusian	discourses	on	mounting	waves	of	climate	 refugees	 that	 misunderstood	 and	 pathologized	 migration.	 But	 it	 is	 worth	signalling	 that	 the	 emergent	 discourses	 are	 not	 bringing	 together	 climate	 change,	migration	and	development	to	‘politicize’	climate	vulnerability	and	adaptation.	They	are	
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